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DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE EU AND ITS 
MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
Ramses A. Wessel* 
Introduction 
Even though the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union 
has been in place for almost twenty years, the division of competences 
between the Union and its Member States in this area remains unclear. Insight 
into this division has become more important in view of the increasing role of 
the EU as a global actor.1 Due to its complex and sui generis nature, the 
question to which extent the EU would in general be covered by the rules on 
international legal responsibility has led to some debate. However, most 
contributions so far have focused exclusively on the European Community or, 
later, on the Union’s competences on the basis of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).2 The importance of having more clarity regarding 
the different roles an international organisation and its Member States play at 
the global level was recently underlined when the Court of Appeal in The Hague 
ruled that the Netherlands was responsible for some actions of Dutch military 
personnel who were part of the UN military mission during the Srebrenica crisis 
in 1995.3 
The Treaty of Lisbon clarified the international legal status of the European 
Union by codifying its international legal personality (Art. 7 TFEU). At the same 
time it refrained from categorising the nature of the competence under both 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) under the headings in Title I: exclusive competences (Art. 
3), shared competences (Art. 4), and competences to support, coordinate, or 
supplement the actions of the Member States (Arts. 5 and 6). Article 2, 
paragraph 4 of the TFEU merely states that competence exists:4 “The Union 
                                                 
* Professor of the Law of the European Union and other International Organizations at the 
Centre for European Studies, School of Management and Governance, University of Twente, the 
Netherlands. I wish to thank Dr. Aurel Sari (Exeter) for some useful comments on an earlier 
draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
  See also M. Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the 
Restructuring of European Diplomacy, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
2011. 
2
 See E. Paasivirta, P.J. Kuijper, ‘Does one size fit all?: The European Community and the 
Responsibility of International Organisations’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2005-
36, 2007, pp. 169-226; S. Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Does The 
European Community Require Special Treatment?’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International 
Responsibility Today, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005, pp. 405–421; F. 
Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating Against the European Union and its Member States’, European Journal 
of International Law, 2010, pp. 723-747. 
3
 Cases Mustafic and Nuhanovic, Gerechtshof Den Haag, 5 July 2011. 
4
 Yet, compare the (I would argue, somewhat absurd) view that a CFSP competence as such is 
lacking as Member States merely use the Union to exercise their own competences. C. 
Hermann, ‘Much Ado About Pluto? The Unity of the Legal order of the European Union 
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shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security 
policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.” One 
may argue that the CFSP and CSDP are not categorised in the TFEU because 
these policy areas (in contrast to all other policy areas of the Union) do not find 
their basis in the TFEU, but in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Yet, even 
the TEU does not define the type of competences involved, nor does it clarify 
the division of CFSP and CDSP-related competences between the Union and its 
Member States. While it may be tempting to argue that the Treaty most 
probably refers to a combination of supportive, coordinating, supplementing, or 
at best shared competences,5 the exclusion of mixed agreements calls for 
international agreements in the area of CFSP and CSDP to be exclusively 
concluded by the EU.6 
The purpose of the present contribution is to investigate some questions 
emerging from the new and ambitious global role of the EU in combination 
with the unclear division of international responsibility between the EU and its 
Member States in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. In that sense 
this paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the relationship 
between international law and EU law,7 albeit with a strict focus on the position 
of the CFSP and CSDP, which is arguably still rather a distinct one. Section 1 first 
of all presents the international legal framework regarding international 
responsibility of international organisations and, above all, their Member 
States. Here I also address the special nature of the EU. Section 2 re-assesses 
the division of competences within the post-Lisbon European Union in the 
areas of CFSP and CSDP. The main question here is who may act under the CFSP 
and CSDP. Finally I discuss some emerging questions, in particular regarding the 
connection between the existing competences in the area of foreign, security 
and defence policy and possible international responsibility. 
I. EU External Action and International Responsibility 
The assessment of the applicable rules will follow the Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, which were adopted by the UN 
International Law Commissions (ILC) at first reading in 2009.8 According to 
                                                                                                                                   
Revisited’, in M. Cremona and B. de Witte, EU Foreign Relations Law ‒ Constitutional 
Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008, pp. 20-51. 
5
 M. Cremona, ‘Defining Competence in EU External Relations’, in A. Dashwood & M. 
Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing 
Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, pp. 34-69, p. 65: “*…+ the CFSP 
appears to be a type of sui generis competence that shares characteristics of both shared and 
complementary competences”. 
6
 R.A. Wessel, ‘The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed 
Responsibilities’, in A. Dashwood & M. 2008, supra note 5, pp. 156-157. 
7
 See in general on this issue: E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti & R.A. Wessel (eds.), International Law 
as Law of the European Union, Boston/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011 (forthcoming). 
8
 2009 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Report of the 
International Law Commission, Sixty-first session, General Assembly Official Records, 
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Article 1, the Draft Articles apply to the international responsibility of 
international organisations for acts that are wrongful under international law as 
well as to the international responsibility of States for the internationally 
wrongful acts of international organisations.  
I.1 The Attribution of Conduct to the EU and its Member States 
The basic principle is that the European Union is responsible for its own 
internationally wrongful acts. Draft Article 3 states: “Every internationally 
wrongful act of an international organization entails the international 
responsibility of the international organization”. Article 4 lists the conditions for 
an internationally wrongful act by an international organisation to entail the 
international responsibility of that organisation: “There is an internationally 
wrongful act of an international organization when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the international organization under 
international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of 
that international organization”. The next question is: which acts can be 
attributed to the Union? According to Draft Article 5 (1) “[t]he conduct of an 
organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of functions 
of that organ or agent shall be considered as an act of that organization under 
international law whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the 
organization.” This somewhat obvious rule indicates that the European Union 
as such can only act through one of its organs. In view of the rules on internal 
responsibility, there are good reasons to interpret the term ‘organs’ as 
‘institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and their servants’.9 In the area of 
CFSP/CSDP this would thus cover not only the Council, but also the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, the Political and 
Security Committee, the EU External Action Service (EEAS) and agencies, such 
as the European Defence Agency or the EU Institute for Security Studies. It 
would also include the missions of the Commission abroad (which are now 
being transformed to EEAS representations) and civilian and military missions 
once these can be regarded as extensions of Union bodies. At the same time, 
however, such a definition raises the question of whether Member States could 
be seen as acting as agents of the Union. 
This brings us to the core of the attribution question. Draft Article 6 makes it 
clear that “*t+he conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an 
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another international 
organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter 
organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.” 
The question, however, is whether the term ‘placed at the disposal of’ an 
international organisation might at all apply to the relationship between the EU 
and its Member States. Only then will the question of whether the EU exercises 
effective control over the conduct of its Member States in terms of CFSP and 
                                                                                                                                   
Supplement No. 10, UN Doc. A/64/10, 2009. A final adoption is planned for 2011, but is not yet 
available at the time of writing of this article. 
9
 Hoffmeister 2010, supra note 2, p. 740, refers to Arts. 340(2) and 263 TFEU as well as to Art. 
51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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CSDP become relevant. This issue has been addressed in relation to the 
European Community, and there seems to be a consensus that the idea of 
‘effective control’ is not relevant when authorities of Member States merely 
carry out Community law.10 While it could perhaps be argued that there once 
was a difference between Community law and CFSP law, at least post-Lisbon it 
has become difficult to maintain that the constitutional relationship between 
the Union and its Member States differs by policy area.11 This brings us back to 
the rule in Draft Article 5, on the basis of which Member States would be seen 
as organs of the EU whenever they take part in the implementation of CFSP and 
CSDP-related decisions. Thus far, however, the special relationship between the 
EU and its Member States is not reflected in the Draft Articles. Nevertheless, as 
the above-mentioned Srebrenica judgment revealed, the ‘effective control’ 
argument may be decisive in establishing the division of responsibility between 
the EU and its Member States in very concrete situations in the framework of 
EU military missions. 
Of possible relevance to the situation regarding the CFSP and CSDP is Draft 
Article 8. This Article allows for conduct to be considered acts of an 
international organisation “if and to the extent that the  acknowledges and 
adopts the conduct in question as its own”. This article applies only in cases 
where “Conduct *…+ is not attributable to an international organization under 
the preceding draft articles” and could therefore be seen as an addendum to 
the general rules of attribution. The situation is somehow mirrored in Article 
61, which states that a Member State of an international organisation is 
responsible for an internationally wrongful act of that organisation if: “(a) It has 
accepted responsibility for that act; or (b) It has led the injured party to rely on 
its responsibility.” The subsidiary nature of this responsibility provided in 
paragraph 2 allows for a shared responsibility between the organisation and its 
Member States.12 
The relationship between the Union and its Member States is at the core of this 
issue and is most prominently dealt with in Draft Article 16.13 What happens if 
the Union adopts a CFSP or CSDP decision that would force (or authorise) the 
                                                 
10
 See Paasivirta & Kuijper 2007, supra note 1.; as well as P.J. Kuijper, ‘Introduction to the 
Symposium on Responsibility of International Organizations and of (Member) states: Attributed 
or Direct Responsibility or Both?’, International Organizations Law Review, 2010, pp. 9-33.  
11
 More extensively: R.A. Wessel, ‘The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An 
Increasingly Coherent Framework of Action and Interpretation’, European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2009- 1, pp. 117-142. But see for instance Kuijper 2010, supra note 10,p. 21), who 
argues that “the divide on this point runs right across the EU, separating its traditionally supra-
national EC part from the intergovernmental CFSP-side”. In his view “the foreign policy powers 
of Member States are unaffected by the fact that certain aspects of foreign and defence policy 
are run on a common basis” (p. 20, footnote 36) 
12
 Ibid, p. 19 
13
 N.M. Blokker, ‘Abuse of the Members: Questions concerning Draft Article 16 of the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations’, International Organizations Law 
Review, 2010, pp. 35-48; as well as J. d’Aspremont, ‘Abuse of the Legal Personality of 
International Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States’, International 
Organizations Law Review, 2007, pp. 91-119. 
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Member States to commit an internationally wrongful act? Article 16 provides 
for a number of situations: 
1. An international  incurs international responsibility if it adopts a 
decision binding a member State or international organization to 
commit an act that would be internationally wrongful if 
committed by the former organization and would circumvent an 
international obligation of the former organization. 
2. An international organization incurs international responsibility 
if: (a) It authorizes a member State or international organization 
to commit an act that would be internationally wrongful if 
committed by the former organization and would circumvent an 
international obligation of the former organization, or 
recommends that a member State or international organization 
commit such an act; and (b) That State or international 
organization commits the act in question because of that 
authorization or recommendation. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply whether or not the act in question is 
internationally wrongful for the member State or international 
organization to which the decision, authorization or 
recommendation is directed. 
Hence, international responsibility of the European Union itself could occur 
both in the case of binding decisions and whenever Member States act under 
an authorisation or recommendation. 
At the same time, a Member State may be responsible when it hides behind an 
international organisation. Article 60 establishes: 
1. A State member of an international organization incurs 
international responsibility if it seeks to avoid complying with one 
of its own international obligations by taking advantage of the fact 
that the organization has competence in relation to the subject 
matter of that obligation, thereby prompting the organization to 
commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have 
constituted a breach of the obligation. 
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether or not the act in question is 
internationally wrongful for the international organization. 
As Kuijper rightfully argues: “[t]his article sets out a series of events that 
virtually no State could bring about all on its own, since it would need at least 
several other States as ‘partners in crime’ in order to incite the organisation 
from the inside to commit an act contrary to the Member States’ international 
obligations to which the organisation would not be bound.”14 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
14
 Kuijper, 2010, supra note 10, p. 28. See more extensively on Art. 60: E. Paasivirta, 
‘Responsibility of a Member States of an International Organization: Where Will it End? 
Comments on Article 60 of the ILC Draft on the Responsibility of International Organizations’, 
International Organizations Law Review, 2010, pp. 49-61. 
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also in the relationship between the EU and its Member States with respect to 
CFSP/CSDP, these types of ‘abuse’ are not to be ignored completely. 
Particularly in this area the debate on the Union’s separate international legal 
status has finally led to an acceptance of the legal personality of the European 
Union, including all its policy areas. It is in fact the existence of this 
international legal personality alongside the legal personalities of the Member 
States that potentially allow both to pass the buck. 
A number of other, general situations may be relevant in establishing the 
division of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States in the area of 
foreign, security and defence policy. These situations do not concern the 
specific relationship between the organisation and its Member States, but 
relate more generally to relationships between international organisations and 
states. Nevertheless, we briefly address them here since ‘Member States’ are 
not excluded in the definition of a ‘State’.15 
First of all, Article 13 of the Draft Articles states that “*a+n international 
organization which aids or assists a State or another international organization 
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter 
organization is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That organization 
does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
organization.”16 The inverse is provided by Art. 57, which under the same 
conditions establishes the international responsibility of “*a+ State which aids or 
assists an international organization in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act *…+”.Given the close cooperation between the Union and its 
Member States in the formulation and implementation of CFSP and CSDP these 
provisions may well be relevant. 
A similar situation concerns the responsibility of an international organisation 
that directs and controls a state (or another international organisation) in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act.17 This is dealt with in Article 14 
of the Draft Articles. Article 58 provides the inverse: “*a+ State which directs 
and controls an international organization in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for that 
act if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful 
if committed by that State.” A situation in which Member States direct or 
control the EU in the execution of CFSP/CSDP may be difficult to find, but it is 
has been suggested that excessive control over the decision-making process of 
                                                 
15
 In fact, ‘States’ are not defined at all and are not referred to in Draft Article 2, which defines 
‘International organization’, ‘Rules of the organization’, and ‘Agents’. 
16
 Emphasis added. 
17
 See more extensively A. Reinisch, ‘Aid or Assistance and Direction and Control between 
States and International Organizations in the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts’, 
International Organizations Law Review, 2010, pp. 63-77. 
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an organisation could lead to (joint) international responsibility.18 Obviously, 
this would be difficult to reconcile with the idea of Member States as ‘seat 
holders’ in an organ of an international organisation. In this view the decision-
making procedure as such is irrelevant as in the end it is the organisation that 
makes the decision.19 Situations in which Member States are directed or 
controlled by the Union form the foundation of the Common Foreign Security 
and Defence policy. It can therefore not be excluded that states may commit 
international wrongful acts on the basis of binding CFSP/CSDP decisions. 
Finally, the Draft Articles foresee situations in which either the organisation or 
the state is subject to coercion by the other. The applicable rules can be found 
in Draft Articles 15 and 59. In view of the theoretical nature of these provisions 
with regard to the relationship between the EU and its Member States, I leave 
this possibility out of the present discussion. 
I.2 The Division of Responsibility between the EU and its Member States 
In view of the fact that the Draft Articles distinguish between the different legal 
personalities of the international organisation and its Member States, it is 
important to return to our analysis of the division of competences between the 
Union and its Member States in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. 
To whom can external conduct be attributed? A distinction should be made 
between international agreements concluded by the EU, decisions made by the 
EU and (military) actions or operations in the framework of the CSDP. 
International agreements with respect to the CSDP are (exclusively) concluded 
by the Union. This assigns primary responsibility to the EU (cf. Draft Article 3), 
particularly because the agreements do not refer to the division of 
responsibility between the Union and its Member States. Indeed, provisions on 
dispute settlement in those international agreements refer to the Union 
exclusively.20 At the same time, Member States may have implementing 
obligations under Union Law, which could imply subsidiary responsibility when 
Member States accept responsibility or when they led the injured party to rely 
on their specific responsibility (Draft Article 61). Such a situation may, for 
instance, occur when Member States act in CSDP operations on the basis of 
international agreements between the EU and a host country. After all, while all 
commitments are entered into by the Union, in the end the Member States, 
either individually or jointly, are the ones that engage in the actual operations.  
When Member States undertake activities on the basis of internal EU 
obligations, the situation is much the same as when Member States act on the 
                                                 
18
 d’Aspremont 2007, supra note 13, p.92: “*…+ member states exerting an excessive control 
over the decision-making process of the organization must be held, together with the 
organization, responsible for violations of international law committed by the organization” 
19
  R.A. Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 2000, p. 516. 
20
 P. Koutrakos, ‘International Agreements in the Area of the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy’, in Cannizzaro, Palchetti & Wessel, 2011, supra note 7. 
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basis of EU decisions. As we have seen, CFSP and CSDP decisions are not only 
binding for the Institutions, but also for the Member States. Again the EU itself 
seems to incur primary responsibility in the event that the implementation of a 
decision results in an internationally wrongful act by either the Union 
institutions or the Member States. The situation is similar in cases where no 
formal decision is made, but where Member States are merely authorised or 
recommended to engage in certain conduct (Draft Article 16). Both courses of 
action are taken quite frequently in the area of CSFP and CSDP but, unlike other 
EU policies, CFSP and CSDP decisions and guidelines hardly ever require actual 
implementation by the Member States. The instruments merely aim at defining 
common policies, which ‒ once established ‒ are meant to restrict the freedom 
of Member States, rather than call upon them to engage in certain external 
action. 
This may be different in the case of CSDP civilian and military operations. 
Decisions taken in this area do compel Member States, or at least authorise 
them, to take certain action. The attribution of conduct in such cases, however, 
is quite complex. According to the agreements, a CSDP mission enjoys the 
status of a diplomatic mission under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.21 Nevertheless, responsibility questions may emerge, for instance in 
relation to human rights or international humanitarian law, or indeed in civil 
proceedings (cf. the above-mentioned Srebrenica cases).22 
In the absence of any explicit rules on the division of responsibilities and given 
the fact that international agreements are ‘exclusively’ concluded by the EU 
and the fact that CFSP/CSDP decisions and operations are primarily to be seen 
as being conducted by the Union, the presumption could be that in all cases the 
EU itself incurs international responsibility. Could this presumption be 
rebutted? The Draft Articles point to possible Member States’ responsibility in 
some situations that are relevant to the relationship between the Union and its 
Member States in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. First of all 
Member States may have implementing obligations, which could lead to a 
subsidiary responsibility when the Member States accept responsibility or when 
they have led the injured party to rely on their responsibility (Draft Article 61). 
Secondly, a Member State may be responsible when it hides behind an 
international organisation for its own international wrongful acts (Draft Article 
60). Finally, Member State responsibility may emerge when a Member State 
aids or assists an international organisation in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act (Draft Article 57); when a Member State directs 
and controls the EU in the commission of an internationally wrongful act; or 
when it coerces the Union to commit such an act (Draft Article 59). As we have 
seen, both aid and assistance and direction and control are not to be excluded, 
although it is difficult to come up with examples of the latter given the fact that 
the adoption of Decisions and the conclusion of international agreements is 




 F. Naert, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in CSDP 
Operations’, in Cannizzaro, Palchetti & Wessel, 2011, supra note 7. 
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subject to formal decision-making procedures. Moreover, these provisions have 
been drafted with the relationship between states and international 
organisations in mind and do not account for the special relationship between 
member states and an international organisation, let alone the very special 
relationship between the European Union and its Member States. 
II. Who Acts under the CFSP and CSDP? 
II.1 The Nature of the European Union 
The legal nature of the European Union remains important in terms of its 
possible international responsibility. The Lisbon Treaty not only integrated the 
European Community into the European Union, but the current Treaty on 
European Union also explicitly provides that “*the+ Union shall have legal 
personality” (Art. 7), thus putting an end to the academic discussion on the 
legal status of the Union.23 There is still some uneasiness on the part of some 
Member States, as reflected in Declaration No. 24, attached to the Lisbon Final 
Act: “The Conference confirms that the fact that the European Union has a legal 
personality will not in any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.” Like 
many Declarations, this one states the obvious. After all, the principle of 
attributed (or conferred) powers forms is a basic one in international 
institutional law and is even explicitly referred to in the new TEU, this time with 
no exception for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): “Under the 
principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain 
the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in 
the Treaties remain with the Member States” (Art. 5).24 Similar careful 
considerations can be found in Declarations no. 13 and 14, which underline that 
the changes “do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they 
currently exist *...+”25 and do not “prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of the Member States”.  
Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, we are left with one international legal 
entity: the European Union. It is difficult not to regard this entity as an 
international organisation and thus subject to the Draft Articles on 
International Responsibility. The convergence of the ‘bits and pieces’ that were 
originally said to make up the Union’s structure26 has created a new 
institutional and normative situation. Indeed, the past years revealed that the 
                                                 
23
 See on this discussion the many references in R.A. Wessel, ‘The International Legal Status of 
the European Union’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 1997, p. 109; as well as ‘Revisiting the 
International Legal Status of the EU’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2000, p. 507. 
24
 On the basis of Article 5 TEU the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity also apply to all 
Union policy areas, although the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality seems to focus on ‘legislative acts’ only and these acts cannot be used for 
CFSP matters. 
25
 Emphasis added. 
26
 D. Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’, CMLR, 
1993, pp. 17-69. 
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nature of the Union is best understood when accounting for the complex 
relation between the different policy areas and between the Union and its 
Member States.27 This complex nature has not prevented the Union from 
becoming an international ‘independent actor’.28  
Indeed, by now it has become widely accepted that the European Union as such 
may bear international responsibility for an international wrongful act.29 The EU 
seems to fit the definition of an international organisation used in the 2009 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations: “For the 
purposes of the present draft articles, the term ‘international organization’ 
refers to an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed 
by international law and possessing its own legal personality. International 
organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities”. 
Obviously, the wrongful act must be attributable to the European Union under 
international law.30 It has been observed that the ILC Draft Articles make no 
mention of the notion of ‘regional economic integration organization’ (REIO).31 
This notion was invented to permit an organisation like the European 
Community to participate in multilateral treaties and conventions as a 
contracting party alongside states.32 In the absence of special rules for the EU, 
we follow the general rules on responsibility of international organisations in 
our assessment of the responsibility of the EU and its Member States in the 
area of foreign, security and defence policy. 
II.2 The Nature of the External Competence 
Although “the nature of the Union’s external competence is an important 
factor in the allocation of international responsibility”,33 this nature is not so 
easy to establish when it comes to foreign, security and defence policy. As 
indicated above, neither the CFSP nor the CSDP are mentioned in the 
categorisation of competences in Article 3 of the TFEU. There are indeed good 
reasons to argue in favour of a ‘shared competence’ concerning external action 
in this area. A shared competence allows both the Union and its Member States 
to make the necessary decisions, but Member States’ competences may be 
exercised only to the extent that the Union has not exercised its own (Art. 2, 
                                                 
27
 R.A. Wessel 2009, supra note 11. Compare for a political science perspective also S. Stetter, 
EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty, 
Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2007. 
28
 The term is used by Paasivirta and Kuijper (2007, supra note 2, p.181) to differentiate the 
European Community from more ‘classical’ international organizations, which are, in their view, 
predominantly meant to be a forum for their members. 
29
 Hoffmeister 2010, supra note 2, p. 724. 
30
 “Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization entails the international 
responsibility of the international organization”. Art. 3 of the ILC Draft Articles. 
31
 The 2004 Energy Charter Treaty (Art. 3) defines a REIO as “an organization constituted by 
states to which they have transferred competence over certain matters a number of which are 
governed by this Treaty, including the authority to take decisions binding on them in respect of 
those matters.”  
32
 Paasivirtaa and Kuijper 2007, supra note 2, p 205. 
33
 Hoffmeister 2010, supra note 2, p. at 743. 
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par. 2 TFEU). It could be argued that this applies to the CFSP. Although there 
are good reasons to presume that pre-emption does not apply to the CFSP,34 it 
is equally difficult to maintain that established CFSP decisions and international 
agreements do not restrict Member States’ freedom to act externally. As 
argued elsewhere, possible restraints on Member States’ freedom to conclude 
international agreements in CFSP fields can stem from both CFSP treaties and 
CFSP-related secondary measures. The extent to which those CFSP norms have 
a restraining effect is also determined by the potential role that the judiciary 
has to play in ensuring that those norms are enforced, as well as by the 
interpretation of the specific CFSP principle of loyal cooperation.35 
In that sense, the effect of CFSP norms on Member States’ powers can be 
considered in the light of the Court’s pronouncements on the effects of 
Community powers in the fields of development cooperation or humanitarian 
aid. This case law suggests that since the Community competence in these 
fields is not exclusive, the Member States are entitled to enter into 
commitments themselves vis-à-vis non-Member States, either individually or 
collectively, with or without Council involvement, or even jointly with the 
Community.36 Does this mean that the ‘exclusivity’ issue has no role to play at 
all in relation to CFSP? Article 3, paragraph 2 of the TFEU reads:  
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion 
of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for 
in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union 
to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion 
may affect common rules or alter their scope.  
Indeed, CFSP rules do not find their basis in a ‘legislative act’. That being said, 
reading this provision in conjunction with the loyalty principle enshrined in 
Article 28, paragraph 4 of the TEU, it seems too early to completely rule out 
exclusivity in the field of CFSP, particularly in view of the fact that the Court 
would have jurisdiction regarding this Article. After all, the Union’s external 
activities in the form of the conclusion of international agreements are 
booming and Member States’ actions increasingly risk affecting common rules 
or altering their scope. While the creation of CFSP norms depends on the 
political will of the Member States, once these norms have been established 
their very purpose is to restrict the freedom Member States traditionally enjoy 
in their external relations. Allowing Member States to affect or even act 
contrary to ‒ common norms established by  international EU agreements 
would amount to rendering most of the CFSP and CSDP provisions in the EU 
Treaty nugatory. 
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In relation to possible international responsibilities, the emerging question is 
whether a hierarchy of competences can be established: to what extent are 
Member States bound by agreements concluded by the Union, and do these 
agreements restrict their individual freedom in external relations? In this 
respect, there appears to be no reason not to apply the so-called Haegeman 
doctrine to EU agreements and to regard them as forming ‘an integral part of 
Union law’.37 The question remains, however, whether the Member States are 
automatically bound by the agreements as a matter of EU law, and indeed 
whether perhaps a ‘direct effect’ of the agreements could even be construed. 
This would make the position of the Member States towards the agreements 
rather different from that of members of other international organisations. 
II.3 Who is Bound by EU External Action? 
Indeed, in addition to the question of the nature of the competence, the 
question of who is bound by international agreements (and perhaps decisions) 
in the area of CFSP and CSDP seems important to assess the division of possible 
international responsibility. 
In the area of CFSP and CSDP, international agreements are concluded by the 
Union. The Union has made full use of its competence in this area.38 By using 
the pre-Lisbon Article 24 TEU competences (in conjunction with Article 38 TEU 
in the case of agreements concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters), the European Union has entered the international stage as a legal 
actor with obligations and responsibilities. This turned the provision into the 
general legal basis for the Union’s treaties whenever agreements could not be 
based on the Community Treaty. These days, the competence to conclude 
international agreements can be found in one single legal basis for the entire 
Union: Article 216 of the TFEU, which provides: “The Union may conclude an 
agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations 
where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one 
of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally 
binding act of the Union or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
The fact that this competence stretches beyond the TFEU itself and includes the 
domain of CFSP is underlined by Article 37 of the TEU, which provides that “the 
                                                 
37
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Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international 
organisations in areas covered by this Chapter” (named ‘Specific provisions on 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy’).39 
All international agreements are, in the end, concluded by the Council.40 In 
contrast to other Union areas, no mixed agreements are concluded in the area 
of CFSP and CSDP. In fact, neither the decision-making process nor the 
conclusion of the agreement reveals a separate role for the Member States. 
Apart from the references to the EU in both the texts and the preambles of the 
agreements and the fact that adoption and ratification are done “on behalf of 
the Union”, this is also confirmed by the central role of the Union’s institutions 
and organs, and the final publication in the L-series of the Official Journal 
(decisions on inter se agreements of the Member States are published in the C-
series). Indeed, “fairly strange operations would be needed to demonstrate 
that a treaty concluded under such circumstances has instead created legal 
bonds between the third party concerned and each one of the Member States 
of the European Union”.41 
Nevertheless and in line with our observations in the previous section ‒ 
internally both the Union and its Member States seem to be bound by the 
agreements. This is underlined by Article 216, paragraph 2, which simply states: 
“Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the 
Union and on its Member States.” Prima facie, this does not change anything 
for third parties: only obligations for the EU arise from these international 
agreements and Member States’ obligations subsequently follow on the basis 
of Union law. At the same time, the question emerges whether this provision 
would play a role in the special position of “the rules of the organization” in the 
law on the responsibility of international organizations.42 
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EU external action, however, not only takes shape in international agreements. 
International responsibility may be triggered on the basis of a number of other 
actions and situations, including the external effects of CFSP decisions, CSDP 
actions and missions and the participation of the EU in international 
organisations.43 
Conclusion 
A first glance at the division of international responsibility between the EU and 
its Member States hints at the EU itself as the actor that would be primarily 
responsible for any international wrongful acts in the area of foreign, security 
and defence policy. What kind of internationally wrongful act could this be? 
Obviously, not living up to international agreements with third states or other 
international organisations could result in such international responsibility. Also 
acts by any agent of the Union (the Institutions, but also the High 
Representative, Special Envoys and CSDP missions) in violation of international 
obligations would be attributable to the Union. Given the upgraded role for the 
EU as a global actor more rules have become applicable to its actions. 
The question is to what extent the EU is a ‘special organisation’ (or perhaps a 
REIO) in the area of CFSP/CSDP. Could one maintain that the ‘symbiotic 
relationship’44 that exist between the EU Community and its Member States in 
the former Community policy areas does not extend to the foreign, security and 
defence policy? As we have seen there are good reasons not to make the 
constitutional relationship between the Union and its Member States 
dependent on a particular policy area. Indeed, the ‘rules of the organisation’ 
(defined in Draft Article 2 as “in particular, the constituent instruments, 
decisions, resolutions and other acts of the organization adopted in accordance 
with those instruments, and established practice of the organization”) may 
differ, but the rules in the TEU provide no indications that international 
responsibility for CFSP/CSDP-related actions or decisions primarily belongs to 
the Member States. 
Nevertheless, we see an emerging research agenda. The complex nature of the 
cooperation between the EU and its Member States in external situations is not 
only related to the unclear division of competences, but also to the actual use 
of these competences in concrete situations. This allegedly makes the 
assessment of international responsibility in the framework of, for instance, EU 
military missions even more difficult than for UN missions. The ‘constitutional’ 
relationship between the Union and its Member States clearly differs from that 
in other international organisations. Even after almost twenty years of CFSP, we 
have not been able to fully grasp the complexity of the relationship between 
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actors in this area. This is problematic as  the increasing external activity of the 
Union demands a more specific definition. 
Secondly, assuming we manage to define and divide the competences, how will 
these relate to attributions? Is merely having competence sufficient grounds for 
the attribution of acts to either the Union or its Member States? Given the 
complex nature of the Union, could acts be attributed to either the Union or its 
Member States in the absence of a clear competence on either side? If we 
establish that CFSP/CSDP agreements and decisions are binding on the Member 
States internally, how does this affect external international responsibility? 
A third set of questions relates to the development of the European External 
Action Service, the emerging diplomatic service in third countries and the 
changing status of the EU in some international organisations. The applicability 
of ‘state rules’ in this area to the EU has hardly been touched upon in academic 
writings. 
These are just some first thoughts that come to mind when considering the 
(planned) increasing activities of the Union at the global level. Given the 
particularities of CFSP/CSDP these issue deserve special attention in the study 
of the international responsibility of international organisations. 
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